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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of EPL on the conversion rate of
temporary contracts into permanent ones in the same rm. Once
EPL is enforced, two e¤ects might arise: employers could tend to re-
place their permanent workforce with short-term employment because
of the lower expected value of a lled job, but rms might also prefer
to stabilize part of their temporary workforce. In fact, rms already
know about workersskills and attitudes and workers have acquired in-
formation about wages, career prospects and employersexpectations.
This in turn implies a lower risk of job-breakup. Which of these two
e¤ects is dominant is ultimately an empirical question. I exploit a
natural experiment set up yielded by the Italian 1990 reform which
introduced unjust dismissal costs for small businesses to identify the
e¤ect of EPL on the conversion rate of working and training contracts
(Contratti di formazione e lavoro - CFL) into permanent ones in the
same rm.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that rms often need to carry out screening procedures to
evaluate workersskill levels before stabilizing the rm-worker job relation-
ship, and it might also be costly for them to dismiss workers once they are
hired. As long as rms cannot make use of any specic tool to evaluate some
of the applicantscharacteristics - i.e. practical skills, cooperative attitudes
- their choice could be ine¢ cient because after a worker is hired and her
unsuitability for the job is understood, a rm has an incentive to dismiss the
worker. But since Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) usually poses
some costs on this choice, rms might be obliged to keep a worker even though
her/his unsuitability1. This in turn implies the presence of ine¢ ciencies and
frictions in rmshiring procedures.
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) state that because of higher ring costs,
the conversion rate of temporary contracts into long-term contracts should
simply drop. Following this reasoning, in the long run we should observe
that rms subject to EPL should progressively convert all the workforce into
a temporary one. But in reality, rms tend to keep a stable workforce even
if EPL is enforced. This behavior can be compatible with economic incen-
tives, in fact if workers need to be trained for specic tasks, rms might not
be willing to iterate training activities each time they dismiss their tempo-
rary workforce. It might also be the case that rms want to retain certain
workers because of their skills. Moreover, high turnover rates could be an
incentive for temporary workers to exert less e¤ort, and this in turn implies
detrimental e¤ects in terms of rm-level productivity. Finally, it could be
too costly for rms to keep unlled jobs each time a contract comes to its
expiration. So, given that rms could also be interested in retaining some
workers, higher EPL could also push rms to be more aware of the "screening
side" of temporary contracts. Thus, EPL could result in a higher conversion
1See Blanchard and Portugal (2001) and Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007).
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rate of xed-term contracts into open-ended ones.
The research question which underlies this paper is thus to shed some
light on the causal e¤ect of dismissal costs on the conversion of temporary
contracts into permanent ones in the same rm. To nd empirical evidence
of this relationship, I study the e¤ect of the Italian 1990 reform - which
introduced unjust dismissal costs for small rms - on the conversion rate of
the Contratto di Formazione e Lavoro (working and training contract - CFL)
into permanent contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the
branch of the literature which this study is nested to. Section 3 describes
the CFL program. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical analysis. Section 5
concludes.
2 EPL: some theoretical and empirical ad-
vances
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is a widely investigated institu-
tional feature of labour markets and consists of a set of rules according to
which the rmshiring and ring processes are regulated. In particular, EPL
denes conditions to be complied with by employers in case of fair and un-
fair layo¤s2. In case of individual dismissal, EPL prescribes advance notice
periods, third partiesroles (for example prior negotiation with trade unions
or administrative authorizations), procedures to challenge the layo¤decision,
and possible severance payments3. Despite they are intended to promote em-
ployment stability, their actual e¤ects are at the centre of an intense debate,
and, in the last two decades, the work of many economists has been of great
help in exploring several dimensions of the impact of EPL reforms on labour
2Fair layo¤s are justied by disciplinary or economic reasons, while unfair layo¤s can
be brought about by several reasons, such as discriminatory practices.
3See Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2008) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
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market outcomes.
From a theoretical point of view, EPL is thought to be a source of distor-
tion of labour market outcomes as long as it a¤ects rmsemployment choices
and workersbehavior. Matching models with endogenous job creation and
destruction in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) predict an am-
biguous e¤ect on the (un)employment rate. Garibaldi (1998) comes to similar
conclusions by extending search models to analyze the cyclical behavior of
job reallocation. Asymmetric responses of job creation and job destruction
are closely related to the nature of ring permissions. Continuously avail-
able ring permissions makes job reallocation countercyclical, but when ring
permissions are time consuming, the asymmetry disappears. Garibaldi and
Pacelli (2008) focus on the e¤ect of severance payments on job separation.
They look at the Italian labour market and use a deferred wage scheme - the
Trattamento di Fine Rapporto - to give empirical content to the theoretical
prediction that an increase in severance payments increases labour hoarding.
Indeed, they nd that a 60% advance withdrawals of accumulated wages in-
crease the probability of separation by roughly 20%. Lazear (1990) shows
that in a perfect labour market, EPL has no real e¤ects on employment, while
transfers from workers to rms (formalized through properly designed labour
contracts) alter the workerswage-tenure prole. Leonardi and Pica (2007)
give empirical content to this proposition. Indeed, they nd a decrease of
the returns to tenure by 20% in the rst year and by 8% over the rst two
years.
Boeri and Jimeno (2005) enrich standard models of employment protec-
tion legislation to give economic explanations to the common practice of
excluding small businesses from EPL coverage. Kugler and Pica (2008) use
administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute to assess the
impact of the increase of dismissal costs for small rms on worker and job
ows, and on rmsmarket entry and exit decisions. They take advantage of
the same reform used in this study and observe a closing gap of worker ows
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after the reform as well as a closing gap of rms ows after the reform. Their
ndings suggest that heavier EPL reduces ows into and out of employment,
but with negligible e¤ects on net employment. They also nd that after the
reform small rms were less likely to enter the market. Ichino and Riphahn
(2005) explore the e¤ect of EPL on workersbehavior in terms of absenteeism
as a measure of worker e¤ort. They use data on white-collar workers from
a large Italian bank, and exploit the presence of the institution of probation
to check whether more employment protection alters the average number of
days of absence from work. They nd that after twelve weeks of probation (a
period etablished by law), new hired workers tend to be more absent. More
recently, Bassanini et al. (2008) empirically investigate the impact of EPL on
productivity in the OECD. The authors provide some evidence of the nega-
tive impact of dismissal regulations on TFP growth, and identify the channel
through which it operates. In particular they nd that changes in labour
composition due to stricter EPL do not play any specic role, while layo¤
restrictions alter the e¢ ciency improvements and the technological change,
thus the productivity.
3 The Italian Contratto di Formazione e La-
voro
Before the introduction of the working and training contract, Italian rms
could hire either on a permanent basis or through apprenticeship contracts4.
Employment agencies (u¢ ci di collocamento) played a substantial monopo-
listic role. Thus, CFLs can be viewed as one of the rst attempts at intro-
ducing exibility in the labour market. Despite the success of the program
over the subsequent years, only few studies have been specically devoted to
4The apprenticeship contract has been introduced in 1959 to provide young people (be-
ing less than 19 years old) with a period of specic training aimed to obtain a professional
degree certicate.
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the analysis of this program5.
The Contratto di Formazione e Lavoro (working and training contract)
has been introduced in 1985 in order to tackle with the high unemployment
rate among young workers. Initially, the program was targeted to people
aged 15 to 29 and it was expected to increase the chance to get a job and
to improve human capital accumulation among young workers. Indeed, the
program established compulsory training activities (o¤-the-job training) be-
side working tasks (on-the-job training and learning by doing). Firms were
encouraged to make use of this contract and to provide some forms of train-
ing through a structure of incentives, such as the reduction of Social Security
fees. The CFL was thought as a xed term contract, in fact it could not last
more than two years and was not renewable. Moreover it could not be con-
verted into an open ended contract before 18 months. After the 18th month
and before the expiration of the contract, the rm had the option either to
hire the worker on a permanent basis or to dismiss her/him without incurring
in any separation cost. As already pointed out, to increase workersfuture
employability, the CFL included a compulsory training period, but it seems
that this feature has remained mostly unheard6. Moreover, the program has
been implemented at the margin introducing some forms of exibility, in fact
it was not targeted to existing workers.
Firmsprotability at using working and training contracts was twofold.
First, rms could adjust the labor force at a lower cost in response to specic
production needs. In this case, rms did not have any incentive to provide
any form of stable training, because it was not convenient to share the cost of
training if they knew that they were not able to exploit the potential benets
coming from the higher level of skills acquired by the worker. Thus, if this
was the main goal that rms pursued when recruiting young workers, they
5Contini, Cornaglia, Malpede and Rettore (2002) and Tattara and Valentini (2005)
explore the implications of the programme on the short- and long-term chances to get a
job; Contini and Revelli (2004) perform a welfare analysis of the program.
6See Contini et al. (2002).
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were frustrating the incentive scheme of the CFL program. Second, rms
could use these contracts as a screening device through which they could
select high ability young workers according to their skill requirement needs.
In this case, when rmsskill requirements were met, part of the working
and training contracts could be converted into permanent ones.
The e¤ects of higher dismissal costs on small rms can be summarized as
follow. An increase in dismissal costs might inuence the job contract conver-
sion rate at least in two ways. First, consider a potential direct e¤ect it may
exert on permanent job accessions. From the rmspoint of view, the fall in
the net present value of labour services makes hiring new workers less worth.
This means that more employment protection should reduce the overall num-
ber of new hirings and thus the number of CFL which are converted in open
ended contracts. Moreover, higher EPL increases labour costs, and this could
be an incentive for rms to substitute long-term employment with short-term
workers. Second, consider a potential indirect e¤ect: as long as the CFL is
an alternative recruitment procedure with respect to standard recruitment
procedures (direct hiring by means of open ended contracts), an increase in
dismissal costs should boost rms to be more aware of the hiring decision.
Although the rise of ring costs for small businesses might lower the use of
working and training contracts, the protability of these contracts after the
reform should rely more on the rmsscreening needs. Since under working
and training contracts, rms get to know workerscharacteristics and abili-
ties, they should prefer this recruitment procedure, and so if a worker has to
be hired, it might be the case that a working and training contract is a good
way to reduce the uncertainty about both workersfuture performances and
the risk of separation. According to this claim, the raise in dismissal costs
might have increased the number of new hirings preceded by a CFL, so the
job contract conversion rate should be rising as well. Which of these two
e¤ects is dominant is ultimately an empirical question and this paper wants
to shed some light on this by following the small rmsbehavior during the
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period 1988 to 1994 and compare it with the behavior of large rms.
My research question is relevant at least for two reasons. First it shows
that a proper evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies must take into
account institutional features, such as EPL. Second, after the di¤usion of
xed term contracts in European countries, a key problem is to establish to
what extent these contracts represents a stepping stone or a dead end to per-
manent employment. As shown by Gagliarducci (2005), repeated temporary
jobs can be detrimental to workers future performances in terms of labour
market outcomes, thus it is interesting to look at the conversion rate of job
contracts within the same rm as an important aspect of policy e¤ectiveness.
4 Dismissal costs and job contract conversion
rates
4.1 Identication strategy.
In order to identify the causal e¤ect of dismissal costs on the job contract
conversion rate, I employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy (DID). The DID
design takes full advantage of the natural experiment set up yielded by the
1990 reform. As a result, individuals belong either to small businesses or
large ones and are observed either before or after the reform. In particular,
individuals are indexed with the i subscript and belong to one of the mutually
excluded groups, i 2 f0; 1g, where i = 0 refers to being employed in a large
rm and i = 1 refers to being employed in a small rm. The rst group is the
control group (or untreated group), while the second is the treatment group. I
consider two independent cross sections, thus each individual is observed only
once, either before (t = b) or after (t = a) the treatment. Dene  i  1[t = a],
where 1[] is the indicator function. Thus  i = 0 if the i   th individual is
observed before the treatment and  i = 1 if the i  th individual is observed
after the treatment. The outcome of interest is the conversion rate of CFL
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into permanent contracts (in the same rm) and can take values equal to 0 or
1. Let y0i be the potential outcome for the i th individual when she does not
receive the treatment, and y1i be the potential outcome for an individual when
she does receive the treatment. Furthermore, let di = i   i be the indicator
of the treatment status, so di = 1 means that an individual is employed in
a small rm after the treatment. What is observed is the triple (yi; i;  i),
where i = (1  i)ib+ iia, and the actual outcome for individual i is equal
to7
yi = (1   i)y0ib +  i[(1  i)y0ia + iy1ia] (1)
The standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences formula is:
ATT =

E

y1aja = 1;  = 1
  E y0b jb = 1;  = 0	 (2)
 E y0aj = 0;  = 1  E y0b j = 0;  = 0	 = DID
For the identication of the treatment e¤ect on the treatedATT  E(y1a 
y0aja = 1), we need the following three conditions to hold8:
Condition 1 E(y0a   y0b ja = 1) = E(y0a   y0b ja = 0)
Condition 2 E(y0b jb = 0) = E(y0b ja = 0) and E(y0b jb = 1) = E(y0b ja =
1)
Condition 3  is mean independent of yjt given t for all j = 0; 1 and
t = b; a.
The rst condition states that if a di¤erence in the outcome between
groups exists, it must be constant over time. If several cross sections were
available, the assumption would become a testable one, but in this study this
7See Lee (2005).
8See, among others, Lee (2005), and Lee and Kang (2006).
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is not possible for at least two reasons: rst the time dimension has been re-
duced in order to avoid the overlap of di¤erent policies; second, since CFLs
last no more than two years, it would be problematic to built subsequent
waves, because in each year there could be workers belongig from di¤erent
waves. To indirectly check the validity of the assumption, I rely on four dif-
ferent subsamples aimed to make the treatment and control groups as similar
as possible. In a rst subsample, I restrict the control group to individuals
belonging to rms with no more than 50 employees. This should reduce
considerably any unobserved di¤erences between treated and control units
in terms of their time-varying responses to business cycle uctuations. The
remaining three subsamples are built by following a propensity score overlap
criteria. I exclude from the original sample those observations whose propen-
sity score lies in the tails of the distributions according to three thresholds,
5%, 10% and 15%9.
Di¤erently from the rst identifying condition, conditions 2 and 3 are
directly testable. These conditions state that the groups composition must
be constant over time, otherwise there would be four di¤erent subpopulations
which would not be informative to extrapolate any causal e¤ect from the
data. In practice, if the two conditions are not violated, any systematic
move between groups is ruled out, and this makes the groups comparable.
Section 4.3 is devoted to this analysis.
The baseline specication used to estimate the e¤ect of EPL on job con-
tract conversion rates is:
E

yji ji; di

= 0 + i +  t + ddi (3)
where the dependent variable yji is a binary variable which is equal to 1
every time a working and training contract is converted into a permanent
one in the same rm and 0 otherwise. i is a dummy which takes the value of
9The Appendix provides a detailed description about the procedure used to estimate
the propensity score.
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1 whenever a worker is employed in a rm with less than 15 employees;  t is
the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for those individuals observed
after 1990; di is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if an individual is
observed after the reform in a small business and is intended to capture the
e¤ect of the policy change. To control for the possibility that the change in
the outcome is driven by the change in workersand rmscharacteristics, I
include a set of covariates which are aimed at relieving this potentially source
of bias. The estimated model is thus:
E

yji ji; di; xi

= 0 + i +  t + ddi + 
0
xxi (4)
where xi is a vector of workers and rms characteristics, including gender,
age, occupation, (log) daily wage, economic sectors, rms age and average
rm size. To control for spacial di¤erences, I also include regional dummies
in separate regressions, as well as interaction terms.
Since the Linear Probability Model has many potentially drawbacks, i.e.
the predicted probabilities might not lie in the 0-1 interval, it is convenient
to rely on an explicit Cumulative Distribution Function. In particular, I
conduct probit estimates for all the specications already outlined and for
all the subsamples.
4.2 The dataset and preliminary analysis
To empirically test my research question, I use the Work Histories Italian
Panel (WHIP)10. The dataset is a 1:90 random sample drawn from the Italian
Social Security Administration (INPS) collecting information on employees
in private rms on an annual basis. From the original data, I build two
independent cross sections, one referring to the pre-reform period and the
10WHIPWork Histories Italian PanelFull Edition, work histories on Social Security
Records compiled by Laboratorio R. RevelliCentre for Employment Studies/Collegio
Carlo Alberto, see http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip.
11
other referring to the post-reform period11. In both cases I select workers
hired under working and training contracts and follow them up to their rst
transition in a di¤erent labour status. I end up with two waves, the rst
includes 3328 observations (with 48.32% employed in small rms, and 51.68%
in large rms), while the second is made up of 2997 observations (with 49.85%
employed in small rms, and 50.15% in large rms). Since the maximum
contract length could never exceed two years, I start following workers since
1987 and 1991. In this way, those who begun working in 1987 have been
followed up to 1989, and, similarly, those who begun working in 1991 have
been followed up to 199312. For each worker, I observe the rst transition
out of the CFL status. I exploit the fact that the WHIP is a linked employer-
employee dataset, so it is possible to know whether or not the subsequent job
was in the same rm and under a permanent position. Every time a CFL is
converted into a permanent contract in the same rm, the dependent variable
takes the value of 1. For each worker, the dataset provides information
on individual characteristics - gender, age, daily wage and worker/employee
status- and on rms characteristics - rms age, economic sector, average
rm size and localization on a regional basis13.
Table 1 reports the number and percentages of observations for each time
period and for control and treatment groups. Note that 1494 individuals were
exposed to the treatment. The table also shows the number of transitions into
permanent contracts in the same rm by rmstype and for both periods.
With respect to the pre-reform period, the total number of CFL signed in
1991 declines both for large rms (-12.62%) and small rms (-7.09%). While
11This choice is driven by the fact that I need to cover a period as homogenous as
possible in terms of the underlying legislation.
12This choice allows me to get a pre-reform wave which is totally una¤ected by the 1990
reform because the last job contract conversion happens to be in 1989. Furthermore, by
selecting the 1991 wave, I avoid taking into account intermediate waves (i.e. the 1989
wave) because the reform might not fully have exerted its e¤ects on them.
13One limit of this study is that few information is available about individuals charac-
teristics such as education.
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for small businesses the proportion of conversions (y = 1) is almost the same
in the two periods, for large businesses there is an evident decline in the
conversion rate of CFL into permanent contracts.
Table 1: Transition matrix
pre-reform post-reform
y=0 y=1 y=0 y=1 Sum
large
firms
695
(40.41%)
1025
(59.59%)
687
(45.71%)
816
(54.29%)
3223
small
firms
970
(60.32%)
638
(39.68%)
918
(61.45%)
576
(38.55%)
3102
Sum 1665 1663 1605 1382 6325
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics by rm size, before and after the 1990
reform. Large rms are systematically older than small businesses, employ
less women and pay slightly higher wages. Small rms are absent from the
energy sector and are less present in the manufacturing sector, while they
are more present as retailers and wholesalers.
4.3 Assessing the balance of covariate distributions
Before running any regression, it is important to check whether there is
enough balance in the covariate distributions among treated and control
groups. This step is particularly relevant in my analysis because the data
come from an observational study. While in experimental studies, the re-
searcher has the opportunity to design the experiment to obtain exact bal-
ance of covariates (and the bias related to the di¤erences in the covariate
distributions is mostly ruled out), in non-experimental data it might be the
case that this source of bias is present, and must be appropriately taken into
account. The most evident case of imbalance is when the support of a given
covariate is di¤erent among treated and control groups, so there are ranges
of covariate values that we do not observe in all the groups. In the WHIP
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Table 2: Individual descriptive statistics (full sample)
Small firms Large firms
(1) Pre-90 (2) Post-90 (3) Pre-90 (4) Post-90
Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Gender 0.524 0.500 0.583 0.493 0.697 0.460 0.675 0.469
Age 22.169 2.818 22.950 3.352 22.35 3.163 22.936 3.184
Worker 0.574 0.495 0.645 0.479 0.655 0.475 0.643 0.479
Log daily wage 3.282 0.264 3.555 0.237 3.391 0.232 3.649 0.260
Firms age 6.241 5.981 7.847 6.721 12.628 8.126 14.073 9.150
Extraction 0.001 0.035 0.003 0.052 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.036
Manufacturing 0.378 0.485 0.373 0.484 0.638 0.481 0.532 0.499
Energy - - - - 0.006 0.076 0.007 0.081
Building 0.095 0.293 0.131 0.337 0.070 0.255 0.094 0.293
Retail/wholesale 0.262 0.440 0.266 0.442 0.131 0.338 0.162 0.368
Hotels/restaurants 0.054 0.226 0.042 0.201 0.022 0.147 0.033 0.178
Transports 0.014 0.116 0.014 0.117 0.023 0.150 0.029 0.167
Finance 0.017 0.129 0.012 0.109 0.021 0.143 0.041 0.197
Real estate 0.150 0.357 0.128 0.334 0.074 0.262 0.088 0.284
Social services 0.030 0.170 0.031 0.173 0.014 0.117 0.014 0.117
Piemonte 0.142 0.330 0.072 0.259 0.148 0.355 0.102 0.303
Val dAosta 0.002 0.050 0.004 0.063 0.002 0.048 0.004 0.063
Liguria 0.027 0.163 0.027 0.161 0.014 0.117 0.017 0.130
Lombardia 0.247 0.431 0.198 0.399 0.266 0.442 0.238 0.426
Trentino A.A. 0.040 0.196 0.031 0.173 0.027 0.161 0.034 0.181
Veneto 0.142 0.349 0.116 0.321 0.124 0.330 0.116 0.321
Friuli V.G. 0.052 0.221 0.037 0.188 0.042 0.202 0.034 0.181
Emilia Romagna 0.129 0.335 0.103 0.304 0.141 0.348 0.096 0.294
Marche 0.034 0.182 0.019 0.136 0.027 0.161 0.027 0.163
Toscana 0.065 0.246 0.067 0.250 0.056 0.231 0.054 0.226
Umbria 0.024 0.152 0.024 0.153 0.018 0.133 0.013 0.115
Lazio 0.066 0.248 0.116 0.320 0.056 0.230 0.086 0.280
Campania 0.010 0.099 0.042 0.201 0.019 0.135 0.051 0.221
Abruzzo 0.008 0.090 0.023 0.149 0.016 0.127 0.026 0.159
Molise 0.003 0.056 0.008 0.089 0.003 0.059 0.006 0.077
Puglia 0.012 0.111 0.045 0.206 0.018 0.133 0.045 0.206
Basilicata 0.002 0.043 0.017 0.128 0.004 0.064 0.007 0.081
Calabria 0.001 0.035 0.012 0.109 0.004 0.064 0.007 0.085
Sicilia 0.004 0.061 0.018 0.133 0.010 0.099 0.018 0.133
Sardegna 0.008 0.090 0.021 0.145 0.003 0.059 0.017 0.13014
data, we run into this situation in just one case, namely the energy sector14.
Moreover, even if there is enough overlap in covariate supports, the distri-
butions might di¤er in their shape. Here I try to mimic the output of the
"research design" phase by assessing the balance of covariate distributions.
If su¢ cient balance is there, then the control groups are more likely to have
similar responsiveness to the underlying economic environment15. Moreover,
the estimates become more credible and inference is more robust because it
is less likely that systematic di¤erences among groupscharacteristics bias
the results.
The assessment of the balance in covariate distributions is carried out on
a univariate basis through mean-comparison tests16, normalized di¤erences
in averages and di¤erences in log-standard deviations for each covariate. I
also conduct a graphical analysis of the covariatesdistributions to capture
any di¤erence which is not detected by the above mentioned analysis. In
particular, I construct histograms for those variables presenting symptoms
of imbalance17.
With a known univariate distribution, let call its rst and second order
moments, respectively,  = E [Xj = ] and 2 = V [Xj = ], with  =
t; cj - where t is for treated and cj is for the j   th control group. The
univariate analysis will look at the following measures:
i. 1 =

t   cj

ii. 2 =

t   cj

q
2t + 
2
cj
iii.   = ln (t)  ln
 
cj

14Note that by excluding the energy sector from the analysis, I only loose ve observa-
tions.
15See Eissa and Liebman (1996).
16Every time the covariate under analysis is a dummy variable, a test of proportion is
carried out, while when the covariate is not binary, a standard t-test is performed.
17Histograms are available upon request.
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To estimate these measures, a natural way is to use sample means and
variances18. Let X t and Xc the sample averages for treated and control
groups, with Xt =
1
Nt
P
i;Wi=t
Xi and Xcj =
1
Ncj
P
i;Wi=cj
Xi; where Nt is the
number of treated units and Ncj is the number of control units in group
j. Moreover, let s2t and s
2
cj
the sample covariate variances, with s2t =
1
Nt   1
P
i;Wi=t
 
Xi  X t
2
and s2cj =
1
Ncj   1
P
i;Wi=cj
 
Xi  Xcj
2
. Thus, the
sample counterparts of (i)-(iii) are:
i. ^1 =
 
Xt  Xcj

ii. ^2 =
 
Xt  Xcj
q
s2t + s
2
cj
iii.  ^ = ln (st)  ln
 
scj

.
Formula (i) has been used to compute mean comparison tests, and table
3 reports the p-values. Under the null hypothesis the group averages are
equal, so we do not wish to reject the null hypothesis, since our hope is to
nd similar averages among treated and controls. Note that in the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences set up, we have four groups, only one of them is the treated
group (small rms after the 1990 reform), while the others can be all thought
of as control groups. Thus, I compare sample covariate averages for treated
and control groups. In column (A), the control group is "large rms after the
reform"; in column (B) the control group is "small rms before the reform";
in column (C) the control group is "large rms before the reform". In each
cell, I report the di¤erence in averages and the p-values in parentheses.
At a 10% level of signicance, we do not reject the null hypothesis of
equal averages in 40 out of 102 cases; at a 5% level of signicance there are
46 cases in which I do not reject the null; while at a 1% level of signicance
the cases are 53. Even though the percentage of rejections is always below
18See Imbens and Rubin (2008).
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Table 3: Group average tests
Variable (A) (B) (C)
Gender -0.092 (0.0000) 0.059 (0.0010) -0.114 (0.0000)
Age 0.014 (0.9089) 0.781 (0.0000) 0.600 (0.0000)
Worker 0.003 (0.8849) 0.071 (0.0000) 0.010 (0.5537)
Log daily wage -0.094 (0.0000) 0.273 (0.0000) 0.164 (0.0000)
Firms age -6.226 (0.0000) 1.606 (0.0000) -4.781 (0.0000)
Extraction 0.001 (0.4096) 0.001 (0.3639) 0.002 (0.1326)
Manufacturing -0.158 (0.0000) -0.005 (0.7909) -0.265 (0.0000)
Building 0.036 (0.0018) 0.036 (0.0015) 0.060 (0.0000)
Retail/wholesale 0.105 (0.0000) 0.005 (0.7723) 0.135 (0.0000)
Hotels/restaurants 0.010 (0.1674) -0.012 (0.1215) 0.020 (0.0011)
Transports -0.015 (0.0059) 0.000 (0.9289) -0.009 (0.0566)
Finance -0.029 (0.0000) -0.005 (0.2692) -0.009 (0.0507)
Real estate 0.039 (0.0005) -0.022 (0.0766) 0.054 (0.0000)
Social services 0.017 (0.0018) 0.001 (0.8788) 0.017 (0.0011)
Piemonte -0.030 (0.0035) -0.052 (0.0000) -0.076 (0.0000)
Val dAosta 0.0000 (0.9917) 0.002 (0.4530) 0.002 (0.3907)
Liguria 0.009 (0.0772) -0.000 (0.9195) 0.013 (0.0095)
Lombardia -0.040 (0.0079) -0.049 (0.0011) -0.068 (0.0000)
Trentino A.A. -0.003 (0.6269) -0.009 (0.1751) 0.004 (0.4927)
Veneto 0.0000 (0.9978) -0.025 (0.0359) -0.008 (0.4901)
Friuli V.G. 0.003 (0.6693) -0.015 (0.0457) -0.006 (0.4158)
Emilia Romagna 0.007 (0.5060) -0.026 (0.0260) -0.038 (0.0012)
Marche -0.009 (0.1192) -0.015 (0.0077) -0.008 (0.1314)
Toscana 0.013 (0.1340) 0.002 (0.7999) 0.011 (0.2141)
Umbria 0.011 (0.0292) 0.000 (0.9325) 0.006 (0.2294)
Lazio 0.030 (0.0064) 0.050 (0.0000) 0.060 (0.0000)
Campania -0.009 (0.2398) 0.032 (0.0000) 0.024 (0.0001)
Abruzzo -0.003 (0.5711) 0.015 (0.0008) 0.006 (0.1829)
Molise 0.002 (0.5024) 0.005 (0.0635) 0.005 (0.0851)
Puglia 0.000 (0.9716) 0.032 (0.0000) 0.027 (0.0000)
Basilicata 0.010 (0.0102) 0.015 (0.0000) 0.013 (0.0003)
Calabria 0.005 (0.1860) 0.011 (0.0002) 0.008 (0.0102)
Sicilia 0.000 (0.9822) 0.014 (0.0001) 0.008 (0.0463)
Sardegna 0.005 (0.4130) 0.013 (0.0019) 0.018 (0.0000)
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52%, and many times the tests suggest unequal averages, the di¤erences do
not seem to be drastically away from each other. In fact, even if the mean
comparison test rejects the null hypothesis, the di¤erence in averages is often
less than a standard deviation19. This suggests that it is important to use a
measure able to take into account the dispersion in covariate distributions.
This check is shown in table 4 which reports the normalized di¤erences in
averages20 (columns 2 to 4) and the di¤erences in log-standard deviations
(columns 5 to 7)21. From the inspection of columns 2 to 6, we can see that
there is overall balance among groups exept for two variables, namely the
log daily wage and rms age. This suggests that the full sample can be
conveniently used as a starting point for the analysis, while more accurate
estimates can be conducted on the subsamples already mentioned.
4.4 The e¤ects of the 1990 reform on CFL conversion
rates
Tables 5 and 6 show the DID results from OLS and probit estimates. Both
tables report marginal e¤ects estimated on the full sample of CFL workers.
Table 7 reports the results from probit estimates carried out on four di¤erent
subsamples. Labels (S1)-(S4) refer to di¤erent specications of the model:
(S1) is the baseline specication, (S2) adds workersand rmscharacteris-
19Here I refer to the standard deviations computed for the covariates of the treated
group.
20Note that the normalized di¤erence is a useful tool because it is a pure measure of
localization corrected by the square root of the sum of variances. An example might clarify
this point. Suppose we have two cases both with a small di¤erence in means (inducing the
reader to think that the situation is positive), but in the rst case the variances are very
low, while in the second are very large. If we do not correct for the variance, we are not
able to detect the lack of overlap around the averages. In fact, when the two distributions
are very concentrated, even a small di¤erence in means must be looked as a potential
source of bias.
21The indexes refer to the comparison between treated (t) and one of the control groups:
c1 is "small rms before the reform", c2 is "large rms before the reform" and c3 is "large
rms after the reform".
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Table 4: Normalized di¤erence in averages and di¤erences in the log-standard
deviations
Variables ^tc1 ^tc2 ^tc3  ^tc1  ^tc2  ^tc3
Gender 0.08 0.17 0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.05
Age 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.05
Worker 0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00
Log daily wage 0.77 0.49 0.27 -0.10 0.02 -0.09
Firms age 0.18 0.45 0.55 0.12 -0.19 -0.31
Extraction - - - - - -
Manufacturing 0.00 0.39 0.23 0.00 0.01 -0.03
Energy - - - - - -
Building 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.28 0.14
Retail/wholesale 0.00 0.24 0.18 0.01 0.27 0.18
Hotels/Restaurants -0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.12 0.31 0.12
Transports 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.25 -0.35
Finance -0.03 0.05 0.13 -0.16 -0.27 -0.59
Real estate -0.05 0.13 0.09 -0.07 0.24 0.16
Social services 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.39 0.39
Piemonte 0.12 0.17 -0.08 -0.24 -0.32 -0.16
Val dAosta 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.27 0.00
Liguria 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.32 0.21
Lombardia -0.08 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07
Trentino Alto Adige -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 -0.05
Veneto -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 0.00
Friuli Venezia Giulia -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 -0.07 0.04
Emilia Romagna -0.06 -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.13 0.03
Marche -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.29 -0.17 -0.18
Toscana 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.10
Umbria 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.29
Lazio 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.33 0.13
Campania 0.18 0.10 -0.03 0.71 0.40 -0.09
Abruzzo 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.51 0.16 -0.06
Molise 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.47 0.41 0.15
Puglia 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.62 0.44 0.00
Basilicata 0.11 0.09 0.07 1.09 0.70 0.46
Calabria 0.09 0.06 0.03 1.13 0.54 0.25
Sicilia 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.78 0.30 0.00
Sardegna 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.48 0.90 0.10
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tics, (S3) controls for regional dummies, (S4) includes interaction terms. The
coe¢ cient of interest is the interaction term between the small rm dummy
and the post treatment dummy. The results are clustered around 4 and 8%
and are statistically signicant in all but one case. More interestingly the
sign is positive in all the specications and for all the subsamples used for
the estimations. This is somewhat reassuring, because it shows that there
is a clear cut dominance of the enhancing e¤ect of EPL on CFL conversion
into permanent jobs. The coe¢ cients reported in table 7 conrm the re-
sults and can be interpreted as a robustness check. The estimates conducted
on the subsample which limit the size of control rms to the 50 employees
threshold is of particular interest. Indeed, the increase in the comparabil-
ity of treatment and control groups tends to emphasize the positive e¤ect
of EPL on the job contract conversion rate. Moreover, even though a large
number of observations are dropped, the magnitude of the e¤ect of the re-
form is very similar to the one found in other specications. In the baseline
model the coe¢ cient is 7%, and in all the other specications is around 8%
with a standard deviation of 0.03. This can be interpreted as evidence of a
switching behavior of small rms towards a more parsimonious use of work-
ing and training contracts as a way to select workers. The threat of dismissal
costs makes rms more aware of the risk of separation, and CFL contracts
represents a sort of insurance against this risk because rms can acquire in-
formation about workers, and - maybe more important - workers can gure
out how their working life will be if they decide to sign an open-ended con-
tract in that rm. Thus, rms are more willing to select workers for their
stable workforce among those already trained under CFLs and that are less
likely to start a separation process. It should also be noted that since I adopt
a regression control strategy, an important check is to look at the sensitivity
of the estimates to the progressive inclusion of control variables22. From the
tables, it is straightforward to notice that the coe¢ cients are substantially
22See Angrist and Krueger (1999).
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stable after regional and sector dummies are included, as well as interaction
terms are added to the regressions. For example, the rst column of results
in table 7 shows that the average treatment e¤ect ranges between 0:071 to
0:081. In particular, the e¤ect is equal to 0:071 in the baseline specication,
and once I progressively add workersand rmscharacteristics plus economic
sector dummies, regional dummies and interaction terms, the estimates are,
respectively, 0:079, 0:081 and 0:080.
The results of this study have aslo policy implications. In the absence of
EPL, a minor fraction of temporary workers is retained by rms. This im-
plies that rms, anticipating this outcome, are less likely to improve training
activities for xed-term workers, reducing the overall degree of future work-
ers employability. This channel acts through the slow productivity growth
implied by less training activities.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I study the impact of stricter employment protection legisla-
tion (in the form of higher dismissal costs) on job contract conversion rates.
Exploiting the Italian1990 reform which increased unfair dismissal costs for
businesses below the 15 employees threshold, and looking at the pre- and
post-reform CFLs conversion rates, I nd that a small, but not negligible
e¤ect was actually there, meaning that dismissal costs made rms more par-
simonious in their hiring procedures. The conversion of CFLs signed in small
rms is 5-8% higher relative to that of large rms. Given that rms could
also be interested in retaining some workers, higher EPL pushes rms to be
more aware of the "screening side" of temporary contracts.
21
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Appendix
Subsamples
Since CFL workers can be observed in just one period, either before or after
the 1990 reform, the data do not have a longitudinal component, but I am
still able to build two waves. A crucial point is that these two waves must
be comparable in order to proceed with the analysis. If the composition
of small and large rms varies substantially between waves, the empirical
analysis becomes unfeasible. I check the plausibility of the strategy adopted
to build the data by comparing the propensity score distributions for small
and large rms in both waves. Since the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), the propensity score has been widely used to reduce the dimension of
the conditioning problem in matching methods. Since in this study, the set
of covariates includes 35 variables, for whom I can only make inference on
the marginal distributions, a practical solution is to look at the propensity
score distributions.
In order to nd a specication for the propensity score, I apply an iter-
ative procedure as suggested by Imbens and Rubin (2008). Among the set
of all K covariates, I rst set up a model in which the propensity score is a
linear function of the following set of KB variables: gender, worker, log-daily
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wage and rms age. Then, I run K  KB logistic regressions including each
time a di¤erent covariate and I perform a likelihood ratio test for the addi-
tional covariate. I use the LR-test statistics to rank the K  KB covariates,
and among them I choose the one with the highest test statistic to enter
the propensity score specication. I repeat the procedure on the remaining
covariates until none of the LR-test statistics is greater than the 2.71 cuto¤
value, which corresponds at a 10% level of signicance23. According to this
iterative procedure, I select a subset KS made up of eleven covariates. Using
the (KB + KS) set of covariates, I generate interaction terms24 and select
those who perform well in terms of likelihood ratio test, as before25. I then
estimate the propensity score according to the following logistic equation:
Pr (small rm = 1) =

1
1 + e X

(5)
where X contains all the selected covariates and the interaction terms.
Figure 2 shows the estimated propensity score by rm size, before and after
the reform. The solid lines are kernel plots of the propensity score distribu-
tions. From the inspection of the histograms, we can see that there are no
drastic changes between the two waves of the cross-sections.
23The table with the LR-test statistics is available on request.
24Note that some of the N(N 1)=2 possible interactions (where N is the number of the
KB +KS covariates) are meaningless (interactions among regions and interactions among
economic sectors), while other interaction terms have not been computed because of the
small number of observations.
25I end up with ve interactions, in particular the interaction of the worker variable
with, respectively, gender, manufacturing and building, and the interaction of the variable
gender with, respectively, manufacturing and lombardia.
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Figure 1: Propensity score distributions
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